Tuesday, October 24, 2006

An answer to an excellent question

In response to my last, The Commenter Presently Known As Arnie asks the very excellent question:

"Since your original question was about the morality of torture, how can you justify not using the Bible? Or are you saying that morality comes from somewhere else?"

That question is so good it deserves not to be buried in a comments section. Let me try, no doubt inadequately, to answer it. It deserves a whole series of essays but I simply don't have time to do it justice. So I hereby proceed to do it an injustice:

Arnie,

I'm not exactly not using the Bible; my whole point of departure is after all Romans 13:4. But it's quite true that I'm arguing that the Bible doesn't address the particular political question of the use of torture as an interrogation technique of last resort against mass-destruction-wielding terrorists. I've laid out in some detail precisely why I don't think any passages of Scripture address the question with enough specificity to let us say, "Thus saith the Lord." Yet you still don't feel that your question has been answered; and I think that's because your question is a deep and general one, rather than a question about this specific issue. I think you want to know how I approach Scripture in general, not how I think Scripture relates to this particular issue. So I'll do my best to explain it.

Basically, morality comes from the nature of God as expressed in this particular creation. Our knowledge of what is moral comes from two sources: special revelation (Scripture and, in some schools of thought, the Church), and natural law. Special revelation is much more reliable, but doesn't cover everything that we want to know. Natural law covers the entire field of human decision-making, but is notoriously unreliable.

The obvious approach, then, is to use revelation as much as you responsibly can. Unfortunately revelation is not unmediated; nobody really trusts sola Scriptura. This is because...

Okay, look, I'm a dad, and I think there's a good chance you're a parent, too. I think most parents would recognize the following experience: you try to explain something to your kid about how you expect him to behave in a certain situation. Then three months later he does something that you really didn't want him to do -- but when you start to talk to him about it, he says, "But you said such-and-such!" And in frustration you hear yourself saying, "But that's not what I meant!" In other words, "Yes, but when I said that I wasn't talking about this situation; you're misapplying my advice."

Now if you look at how you deal with your kids you will see that sometimes you don't get mad at them for misunderstanding you, because it was an understandable mistake. On the other hand, sometimes you get royally angry because you know that they knew exactly what you meant and they're just making excuses. In that case, you would say, "You know perfectly well that's not what I meant! And now you're grounded."

But sometimes they were honestly confused, and yet you get annoyed with them all the same. That's because their confusion comes from their having been too lazy to bother to ask themselves what you meant. In that case, when they say, "But I thought you meant..." you are likely to say something like, "Then you weren't listening very carefully." Which means they're still in trouble.

My point is that we expect our children to respond to what we meant, not to what they wish we meant or to what they can (like little Supreme Court Justice wannabes) pretend we meant. And even though we recognize that honest misunderstandings happen, we still consider that our children have a duty to put some effort into thinking about what it is we really meant and how we want them to act in different situations -- even when they're in a situation for which we haven't given them specific instructions. Furthermore, we don't expect them to run around telling everybody in the neighborhood, "My daddy says..." when what they're saying is not at all what we meant; if they're going to go around telling people, "My daddy says..." then there's a much higher standard of caution and diligence that we require of them, to make sure they aren't giving their own opinion disguised as ours.

Now the situation we are in when we come to Scripture, is that we have a record of things that God has said to our older brothers and sisters, when they were faced with various situations that were more or less similar to situations in which we find ourselves -- in some situations more, and in some situations less. And from what God has said to them, we have to deduce (barring direct instruction from the Big Guy himself) what God wants us to do now. In some cases, it's easy: if your neighbor's wife is gorgeous, and you sneak over while he's gone and knock her up, and then you arrange to have him killed so that you can marry her, well, God doesn't like that. In other cases it's not so easy.

To return to my analogy: let's say that I have two sons; that when the older was first a teenager we were living in some fiercly traditional Muslim country; that before the younger hit puberty we moved back to the States; and that for the past five years I have been in a coma. When we were in Islamostan my older son wanted to date, but I told him he was not allowed to, and that I was not at any time to see him so much as holding hands with a girl. Now my younger son wants to start dating, and the question they are asking themselves is: would Dad approve?

In order to settle that question, if they are at all sensible, they will ask themselves why I laid down that rule, and how general a principle I meant it to be. And they will draw on their memories of all the other conversations we had...if, for example, I had been heard to say that the practice of dating was a clear sign of Western post-Christian decadence, that would argue strongly for the idea that I would be opposed to all dating. If I had told my older son that I didn't want him dating and had added, "I don't want you killed by some honor-obsessed older brother," that would tend to support the idea that I wasn't opposed to dating per se, but just thought it inadvisable in that particular special situation.

But if I had said at some point, "You know, when you're a teenager living in America, dating is how you get to know a girl you think you might be interested in marrying," then the older brother would definitely be way out of line if he tried to say, "We're not allowed to date because Dad told me so." That would be a clear misrepresentation of what I had meant when I told him, "You're not allowed to date," given what I had said about dating in America.

Yet even in that last case, even after we had established that the boys could date as long as they were in America, there would still be the question of what you were allowed to do on a date. And if I hadn't said what those rules were, then it wouldn't be right for one boy to say to the other, "Well, Dad says you can't do such-and-such on a date." But that wouldn't mean that they could therefore just do whatever they wanted to because, "Hey, Dad didn't say anything one way or another." They would still need to look at the general purpose I had laid out for dating (to decide whether you really wanted to marry a particular girl, in my hypothetical), and then work out for themselves what rules seemed best to honor the general principles I had taught them, while in the special situation of dating.

For example, if I had given them a general rule that sex was out until they got married, then the question of, "Can I jump her bones?" would be readily answered. But the question of, "Does holding hands count as sex?" might be a bit trickier. There would even be room for sincere disagreement between the brothers. But they would both be responsible for doing their best to do what I wanted, while still recognizing the differences between:

1. What I said clearly they could and could not do.

2. What they thought I probably meant by some of the things I didn't say as clearly as they would have liked.

3. What I didn't address, but that their own best efforts to be reasonable and to apply the principles they learned from me, led them to think I probably would say if I were to pop out of my coma long enough to answer a few pointed questions.

4. What I didn't address, and that their own best efforts, etc. led them to think I wouldn't care about one way or the other.

What I'm trying to illustrate is that sola Scriptura, if interpreted to mean "Scripture literally on its own," has never been realistic; every human being is faced with moral choices where he has to try to do the right thing even though Scripture doesn't give him explicit instructions, and in such cases he must bring to bear all the resources at his disposal -- guidance of the Holy Spirit through prayer, wise counsel from other people (which includes Church tradition), his own moral intuition, reason, empirical evidence, etc. When he does so, some of the answers will be clear and some will still be tough. In the end, you make your best and honestest effort and trust to God's grace to deal with the things you get wrong.

So, in the places where it's not easy to know what God means, we don't actually wind up trusting Scripture per se. We wind up trusting somebody's interpretation of what God meant to say -- our preacher's, or our parents', or the Pope's, or C. S. Lewis's, or our own logic, or what we think we heard God tell us in the prayer closet, or (what is probably wisest in most cases) a mix of all of that -- the voice of the Spirit, the Church, tradition, and reason. Where Scripture speaks clearly -- and it often does, even though people who don't like what the Scripture says try very hard to pervert its meaning -- then it trumps everything. Where Scripture doesn't speak clearly, you bring to bear all the resources at your disposal to help you make the decision that is most likely to be God's will for you.

If Scripture addressed the question of torture clearly and unambiguously, I would absolutely yield to Scripture. But it doesn't. And if it doesn't, then I have no business running around pretending that what are actually rules I've come up with out of my own head, are established by Divine endorsement; that is the kind of presumption for which Jesus ruthlessly condemned the Pharisees. But even in the cases where Scripture doesn't choose to answer our questions, you're not off the hook for behaving morally.

And it is for precisely that reason that I started this whole thread. The question of the limits of magisterial violence seems to me to be precisely one of those questions where (a) there's a right answer, (b) it's important to come as close to the right answer as we can, and (c) God has chosen not to give us much help in the way of the shortcut that is special revelation. And that's why, my dear Arnie, even though you're being deeply critical of my position and have been rather less than gentle in expressing your opinion of my moral character, I'm grateful for, and not in the slightest offended by, your admirably voluminous comments. On tough questions like this, there's nothing a sincere Christian needs more than a few other sincere Christians who think he's utterly in the wrong and are willing to explain in painstaking detail why it is that they think so.

Does that help?

5 Comments:

At 8:34 PM, Anonymous Anonymous said...

I will take back my nasty comment about what kind of christian are you.

I suspect in the long run, we will need to agree to disagree.

I understand your view a little better.

I do disagree that the admonisions to love thy enemy is only to be used in a personal context. I do see your point about the magistrate, but my argument there is what if you are the magistrate? How should you act? Since the US is a govoernment of by and for the people. we should be acting out personal duty.

I agree very strongly that Church and State should be separate, however, that does not mean we should separate within ourselves morality of self, and morality of state.

 
At 10:58 AM, Blogger Ken Pierce said...

[grinning] You don't need to take anything back; I haven't been offended, and when my friends use strong language that is helpful -- because it tells me what they feel strongly about. And until you know what other people feel strongly about, you don't even know what the issues are that you're arguing about in the first place. So, no worries. Whenever something I say upsets or enrages you, just let it fly.

I think that even the magistrate should love even the state's enemies; but loving the enemy and killing him -- or waterboarding him, for that matter -- are in certain cases perfectly compatible; because Christian love is something rather more grown-up and complex than merely not wanting to see somebody subjectively unhappy. The traditional phrasing of the sentencing of murderers to be hanged captures this perfectly: "...and from thence to the place of execution, and may God have mercy on your soul."

Or see, for example, the scene in The Virginian in which the Virginian takes part -- at great emotional cost to himself -- in the vigilante hanging of his former best friend, who has in the narrator's words "lost that species of honesty that respects the ownership of other people's cattle." The participants all know each other; they all like each other; they were all friends back in the day. The hanging is something that everybody involved, included the guests of honor, accept must be done. But the executing party are at great pains to do everything they can do to make the morning of the execution as easy on the condemned as they can manage to make it, and the Virginian's friend goes out of his way to joke and be friendly with his executioners in order to make it easy on them -- because he recognizes that it is emotionally traumatic for an ordinary decent person to have to hang a man, and it isn't their fault they're having to hang him. That is, he laughs and jokes with everybody but the Virginian, who was his best friend...and if you want to know why, then you must read the book, which you should do anyway.

My point is that everybody involved in the scene likes each other; they all regret that the two condemned men have chosen a course of action that makes their hanging necessary; they all recognize the necessity; and they all intend to do what must be done but as gently (bizarre as that seems to the modern, especially liberal, mind) as possible. For, even though the two rustlers have made themselves enemies of society and what must be done must be done, their executioners are still their friends and are still decent men.

(It will from this be apparent that the first and greatest of all Western novels -- the novel that invented the genre of "the Western" as surely as The Lord of the Rings invented the genre now known as "fantasy" -- wrestles with far more profound and difficult philosophical and emotional issues than do its successors.)

But all this is to anticipate my discussion of the Golden Rule. I will tell you this much, as a preview: I believe that if we really understand the Golden Rule, and if we really make the effort truly to identify ourselves emotionally with the terrorist in the hypothetical situation where waterboarding the terrorist is the only way to keep a plot to kill 50,000 innocents from being successful, then we-the-terrorist would prefer to be waterboarded than to live the rest of our lives, after the repentance that we must posit when properly applying the Golden Rule, carrying the burden of the suffering we had caused and could not undo. But the full exposition of this view is much too long for a comment.

>
my argument there is what if you are the magistrate? How should you act?
>

Well, yes, that's exactly the question, isn't it?

It's part of the more general (and exasperating) fact that a person's position changes his duties and privileges. A father has authority over his children, but then he also has responsibility for his children. A brother can't order his brother around the way his father can because he isn't his father; he also doesn't answer for his brother's upbringing the way his father does because he isn't his father. The general principle "submit to one another out of reverence for Christ" is suspended in the special case of a father dealing with his child -- the father does not submit to the child and God would get annoyed with him if he abdicated his parental responsibilities by so doing -- and a special set of rules applies (e.g., "Fathers, do not enrage your children" -- whatever that means). When the question is, "How should the people in this special father-child relationship relate to each other?" we get slightly different answers than we get in the general case of peer-to-peer relationships (which are the subject of the bulk of the Bible's ethical teachings). I suppose you can call that "separating within ourselves morality of self, and morality of role," though I don't really think it's so much a matter of separation as of distinction -- but at this point we're down to the question of which term sets up the proper emotional resonance, and the same word most likely resonates differently for you than for me.

I think the general rule in such special cases goes to the general philosophical rule that "who wills the end, wills the means." That is, if God has given you a particular responsibility, then it must be moral to fulfill that responsibility, and where a particular general precept is flatly incompatible with the God-given responsibility, then that precept must not apply. At the same time, I presume that we should wish to apply as many of the standard precepts as possible, and to apply them to the fullest extent compatible with the special responsibility. A father who submits to his child cannot possible do so out of reverence for Christ, because Christ has commanded him to discipline his children. But he can do his best to make his discipline as gentle as he can make it without making it ineffective; and he can do his best to give the child as many choices as are possible within the limits of safety and character development. A sports-mad father who forces his child to play sports when the child really wants to be in the chess club, is violating the spirit of the submit-to-others rule, I would argue, because the father's authority is given solely for the purpose of shaping the child's character -- and if it is not a question of the child's character, then the ordinary submit-to-others principle comes right back into force. Does that make sense?

And a similar sort of approach is what we have to take, I think, as magistrates, and as citizens who in the last analysis are responsible for the behavior of our government. God has given the magistrates a responsibility to "punish the evildoer" by violent means. I think myself that this is because the strong have a basic duty to protect the weak from the depradations of the violent; I think that in a state of anarchy (including the temporary anarchy in which there are no policemen handy and no time to summon one) each individual bears that responsibility; I think that in any well-ordered society the best way to make the highest number of people safe -- and the way that God prefers, as Paul is trying to explain in Romans 13 -- is to designate definite people with a special responsibility for the protection of others and to hedge their license to violence with restrictions to ensure that their cure is not worse than society's original sickness. The question then becomes a prudential and pragmatic and empirical question of where the tradeoffs are optimal -- very much the sort of judgment calls that parents have to make when deciding how much freedom is the right amount of freedom to grant a teenager.

But where that line ought to be drawn in any given situation and society, while it is an important question for Christians to wrestle with, is not a question that Scripture gives us the answer to. How we ought therefore -- as Christians -- to approach the problem, is precisely what this thread is trying to work out. There is a line; on that we agree. And a Christian magistrate does not give up his responsibility to be a Christian when he takes his oath of office, any more than a Christian father stops being a Christian whenever he acts in his paternal capacity, even though certain special rules apply to his paternal behavior. On that, I think you and I are both very strongly in agreement.

I think our disagreement is only about where to draw the line.

 
At 10:32 AM, Anonymous Anonymous said...

By the way, I am anticipating your justification of torture in other ways.

Respectfully

"arnie"

 
At 8:39 AM, Blogger Ken Pierce said...

Trying to get there...just an absolutely insane week at work. My timesheet this week is going to have something like 55 billable hours...and since Dessie has been sick most of the week I've been doing grocery shopping and cooking for ten on top of that. I'll get to it as soon as I can.

 
At 1:08 PM, Anonymous Anonymous said...

Ok, take your time. Take care of those kids.

 

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